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THE RECENT DRUG-ASSOCIATED VIOLENCE 
on the Mexico side of the Mexico-U.S. border, 
the “narco-terrorism” in Colombia during the late 
1980s and 1990s, and the tales of the prohibi-
tion era in the United States are all examples of 
criminal organizations that fight either against each other or against the 
state and cause an inordinate amount of cruelty, violence, and death. 
These and other episodes have led most people to conclude that “drugs 
cause violence” and therefore “to end violence on the Mexican border 
we have to eliminate illegal drugs.” These assertions imply that drugs 
and violence are intimately linked. But, is it true? 
The Relationship of Drugs and Drug-Related Violence 
Drugs and drug-related violence do not overlap in either time or 
space: “Even without the protection of the state and courts, illegal 
drug markets are generally peaceable. However, occasionally specific 
markets exhibit high levels of violence” (Reuter 2009: 275). Mexico 
for example, has had drug trafficking for a century, and while there 
were individual cases of murder associated with drugs, the illegal drug 
industry was relatively peaceful. Only in the last decade has it become 
extremely violent. Until the late 1990s, the share of the illegal drug 
sector in the Gross National Product (GDP) was significantly higher 
in Bolivia and Peru than in Colombia, but drug-associated violence 
was very high in the latter and very low in the former two (Thoumi 
2003). During the last decade, illegal drug income has accounted for 
about one-third of Afghanistan’s GDP, but drug-associated violence 
has been remarkably low. 
 The empirical evidence shows clearly that there is no direct “cause 
and effect” relationship between drugs and violence. In other words, 
when there are very large, easy to obtain illegal drug profits, it is not 
“natural” that people kill each other for them. 
 In both Colombia and Mexico, one frequently hears claims such 
as: “Drug legalization is the only solution” because “when there is 
demand, there will always be a supply.” There is no doubt that if there 
were no demand, there would be no supply, but if demand would be 
the determining factor for production, then every country where coca 
and poppy could grow would be growing them, and every country 
where cocaine and heroin could be refined and trafficked would be 
doing so. The map of illegal drugs shows a very high concentration in 
production. All coca and cocaine are produced in only three countries: 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Three countries produce 95 percent of 
opium poppy and heroin: Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Laos, and if 
Mexico and Colombia are thrown in, it becomes 99 percent. 
 There is no market theory that can explain this extreme concentration. 
Why does Colombia face much more competition in the international 
coffee markets than in cocaine, and why does Mexico have more com-
petition in clothing manufacture than in heroin? In Mexico many 
argue that the country’s location halfway between Colombia and the 
United States is the reason for its involvement in drug trafficking. This 
is reminiscent of similar explanations in Colombia in the 1980s: the 
country was halfway between Bolivia and Peru to the south and the 
United States to the north. Location matters, of course, but being a 
transit country does not imply that the nationals of that country should 
dominate the trafficking networks.
 The concentration shown by the maps of drugs and violence forces 
the observer to seek domestic explanations, for example, what do 
Colombia and Mexico have that has resulted in their dominance of 
some international drug markets, and why in those markets is there 
or has there been so much violence? 
Factors Promoting Crime and Illegal Drugs
When looking at domestic factors that encourage the development 
of criminal organizations and illegal drugs, people normally attri-
bute causality to poverty, income and wealth inequality, economic 
crises, frustrated expectations, corruption, and the like. These factors 
may play important roles, but they are not causes in the sense that 
once they occur, crime and drugs also occur. Indeed, most poor people 
in very unequal societies or facing economic crises do not become 
criminals. On the other hand, some members of the upper classes 
have been involved in illegal drugs and crime. Corruption may encour-
age crime, but crime itself is a principal supporter of corruption. 
These are contributing factors to crime and illegal drugs, but none 
of them is either necessary or sufficient for criminality and drugs 
to appear.
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 In order to have illegal drugs, it is necessary to have an illegal 
demand and an illegal supply. This is why “legalization” is so appealing: 
it eliminates a necessary factor. For many reasons not discussed here, 
the world will not legalize the cocaine and heroin markets. So, for the 
sake of countries like Colombia and Mexico, it is imperative to ask: 
what are the necessary conditions for supply to develop? Illicit drug 
industries require the performance of several industry-specific tasks 
that are not required by legal activities: the growing of illegal crops, 
the development of illegal distribution networks, etc. “Successful per-
formance of these tasks requires special ‘illegal skills’ used to develop 
illegal business organizations, social support networks to protect the 
industry from law enforcement efforts, and contract enforcement and 
conflict resolution systems within the criminal organizations, to have 
the will to break economic laws and regulations and to use violence 
if necessary” (Thoumi 2003: 56). To achieve this, there have to be 
people willing to break some laws and a support network of people 
who consider such illegal activities appropriate. 
 When the rule of law prevails, crime is limited to that committed by a 
few “bad apples” and common law enforcement efforts can keep crime 
levels low. When a significant group does not accept the formal rules 
as legitimate, if breaking laws is justified because they are or appear 
to be enacted by particular groups that benefit from them, then the 
society becomes vulnerable to the development of organized crime.
There are other necessary factors related to cocaine and heroin pro-
duction such as having the knowledge to refine cocaine or heroin and 
having the appropriate environmental conditions to grow coca or 
poppy. The labor skills needed are abundant in almost every country 
today and can easily be bought. 
 Interestingly, there are no sufficient factors for the development of 
illegal crops or illegal drug trafficking. “Some factors are necessary to 
develop coca and poppy plantings and cocaine and heroin production 
and exports. To do so countries must have the full set of necessary fac-
tors. There is also a wide spectrum of potential contributing factors. 
These might trigger the development of the illegal industry only if all 
the necessary conditions are present” (Thoumi 2009).
 “The lack of a sufficient factor makes it possible to have a society with 
all the conditions for the development of the illegal industry and which 
has, however, not developed it. Such a society, however, would be very 
vulnerable and could develop the illegal industry. The appearance of a 
new contributing factor, for example, could trigger it. Criminal activi-
ties develop as a result of evolutionary processes, not Newtonian ones 
with well defined causality of the type ‘Y=f(X)’ that is ‘if X, then Y 
happens.’ This is why some societies that have all the necessary con-
ditions for the development of the industry do not currently have it” 
(Thoumi, 2009). 
 The existence of strong criminal organizations does not necessarily 
indicate high levels of violence. Criminal organizations control the use 
of violence to avoid the government focus on them. Needless to say, a 
very wealthy drug trafficker cannot enjoy his money in the cemetery. It 
is only when those controls weaken because the structure of the orga-
nization changes or when the organization itself decides to fight the 
state that violence erupts. These eruptions are particularly bloody and 
savage if the perpetrators are willing to use violence without regard to 
the consequences for society, or when they simply want to “hit where 
it hurts the most,” that is, family members, children, etc. 
Why Do Policies Fail? Why Is Violence So Difficult to Control?
The repressive anti-drug policies implemented during the last forty years 
of the “war on drugs” have not eliminated illegal drugs and will not do so 
for a simple reason: they attack some of the contributing factors to illicit 
drug development, but almost never deal with the necessary conditions 
for sustaining an illegal industry. The development of organized crime 
and the illegal drug industry is due to issues related to governance and 
the rule of law. Repressive policies are based on a police model focused 
on eliminating “bad apples” that does not deal with the underlying 
factors that encourage such developments in the society. 
 Not surprisingly, the illegal drug industry has adapted in response to 
government policies. In Colombia, the industry was controlled by two 
large cartels in the 1980s, which were destroyed by the mid-1990s. Left-
wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups then controlled the 
coca plantings, cocaine refining, and trafficking. During recent years, both 
guerrillas and paramilitaries have been weakened, and the drug industry 
in Colombia is now controlled by an unknown number of smaller traffick-
ing bands. The industry’s control went from “drug lords” to “warlords” to 
“gang lords.”
 In the late 1980s, the U.S. attacked the Caribbean routes, and Colom-
bian traffickers sought new routes through Mexico. As the Colombian 
cartels weakened, Mexican groups gained market share in the U.S., 
and when the PRI lost political control of many Mexican states, the 
Mexican trafficking organizations ended up competing for domestic 
drug markets and for dominance of the American market. This has 
been a very bloody period in many areas of Mexico, and today it is 
well known that Mexico is a victim of a very high level of violence. 
Ironically, during this period the homicide rate in Mexico in reality has 
been falling! This shows that the drug violence is confined to small 
areas, and while there are some innocent civilian victims, the violence 
tends to be limited to intergang and gang-state encounters.
 The challenge that organized crime presents for the state is how to 
impose the rule of law. One option is to co-opt and control criminal 
organizations, allowing them to operate within some “reasonable” limits. 
This might have worked in the past, but it is unlikely to work now. The 
other option is to impose the rule of law, not just by a strong arm of 
the state but by having it internalized by the citizenry, by making them 
full modern citizens with a sense of belonging to the state so that the 
socially accepted norms coincide with the formal legal requirements. 
This is, of course, a huge challenge. The question is whether countries 
like Colombia and Mexico are ready to respond to it.
Francisco Thoumi was the Tinker Visiting Professor at LLILAS during 
fall 2009.  
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